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I. INTRODUCTION: A “LICENSE TO KALE”1
Food and diet are popular and ubiquitous topics.2 The internet and
exponential expansion of the diet industry have made obtaining and sharing
nutrition information increasingly simple.3 Despite the availability of
information, however, over 70% of Americans are considered overweight
or obese, and obesity related illnesses are among the top causes of death in
the United States.4 With so much information readily available and the

1. This is play on words referencing the Eon Productions film, License to Kill, starring
Timothy Dalton as James Bond. A “license to kill” is a unique character trait associated with the film
character James Bond, which references the permission to act with deadly force granted only to specific
secret agents. See MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(describing the character trait of “license to kill” as unique to the film character James Bond). Kale is
a cruciferous vegetable rich in vitamin K that might be specifically discussed by a licensed and
registered dietitian during a one-on-one nutrition consultation with a person taking blood thinning or
anticoagulant medication. Cristina Leblanc et al., Avoidance of Vitamin K-Rich Foods is Common Among
Warfarin Users and Translates into Lower Usual Vitamin K Intakes, 116 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS
1000, 1000–01 (2016); The Nutrition Source, Kale, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.
harvard.edu/nutritionsource/food-features/kale/ [https://perma.cc/34LQ-66J9]. This Comment
proposes licensure laws regulating the practice of nutrition and dietetics should be enacted by State
legislatures and upheld by the judiciary. Where James Bond was permitted to use deadly force with a
“license to kill,” states must have the choice to specifically enact nutrition licensing laws giving state
identified nutrition professionals a “license to kale.”
2. The United States weight-loss market accounted for $72 billion in 2018. The U.S. Weight
Loss & Diet Control Market, MKT. RSCH. (Feb. 2019), https://www.marketresearch.com/MarketdataEnterprises-Inc-v416/Weight-Loss-Diet-Control-12225125/ [https://perma.cc/PF6K-6CWV].
3. See Susannah Fox, The Social Life of Health Information, 2011, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 12,
2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/15/the-social-life-of-health-information/
[https://perma.cc/KC4A-8GEN] (showing almost 60% of U.S. adults access health information
online). The global weight loss and weight management market accounted for $168.95 billion in 2016
and is projected to reach $278.95 billion by 2023. Weight Loss and Weight Management-Global Market
Outlook (2017-2023), ORBIS RESEARCH (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.orbisresearch.com/reports/
index/weight-loss-and-weight-management-global-market-outlook-2017-2023 [https://perma.cc/UY
X4-242K].
4. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SELECTED HEALTH CONDITIONS AND
RISK FACTORS, BY AGE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1988–1994 THROUGH 2015–2016
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/053.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3RM-CT4P].
Overweight is defined as having a body mass index (BMI) of 25.0 to 29.9, and obese is defined as
having a BMI of 30.0 or greater. BMI is measured as “a person’s weight in kilograms divided by the
square of [their] height in meters.” About Adult BMI, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html [https://perma.cc/69KP
-CPLE]. BMI is moderately correlated with body fat measurements obtained from more direct body
fat estimation measures. Id.
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“Weight of the Nation”5 generating such a high demand,6 consumers may
be unsure about who and what to rely on to receive competent and
efficacious nutrition advice.7 This is further complicated for people with
diet related comorbidities, who especially require safe, evidence-based
information and consultation to prevent harm, which in some situations
may include death.8
Given the stakes involved and the potential for harm, it may not be a
shock to learn that giving specific nutrition advice to someone with a disease
or medical condition could be against the law if you don’t have a license to
do so.9 Professional licensing laws regulating the practice of medical
professions like nutrition and dietetics are of utmost importance—these
laws are designed to protect the public from the harm caused by inaccurate,
uninformed, and inefficacious medical information.10 Medical licensing
laws protect the public through several different mechanisms. Most
notably, these laws may enact practice exclusivity, which allows only
qualified medical practitioners meeting state-specific education and
experience levels to lawfully practice the profession within the state and use
certain professional titles.11 Any unlicensed but practicing individuals, or
those who are inappropriately using covered titles, are violating the law and
5. National Institutes of Health, NIH and the Weight of the Nation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERV., https://www.nih.gov/health-information/nih-weight-nation [https://perma.cc/6P
PC-SX92].
6. See Crescent B. Martin et al., Attempts to Lose Weight Among Adults in the United States,
2013–2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT. 5 (July 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/
databriefs/db313.htm [https://perma.cc/WWM8-ZQJY] (finding among U.S. adults who reported
trying to lose weight during the past twelve months, over 62% tried eating less food, over 50% tried
increasing fruit and vegetable intake, and over 42% tried eating less junk or fast food).
7. Wendy Phillips & Pepin Andrew Tuma, Consumer Protection Through Professional Regulation,
119 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 1561, 1561 (2019).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.504 (West 2019) (“No person may engage for remuneration
in dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling or hold himself or herself out as a practitioner
of dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling unless the person is licensed in accordance
with the provisions of this part.”); Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7, at 1561–62 (explaining the need for
providing reliable information on safe therapies and practices to help people avoid the dangers of
receiving unscientific or medically unnecessary treatment). But see Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and
the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 183 (2015) (suggesting an occupational licensure law
providing practice exclusivity for psychologists as creating “outrageous” situations).
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.502 (finding the unskilled and incompetent nutrition counseling
or practice of nutrition and dietetics is a danger to public health and safety).
11. See Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7, at 1562–63 (explaining the different levels of state dietetic
licensure laws and how licensure with practice exclusivity provides the greatest amount of consumer
protection).
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subject to legal penalties such as injunctions, fines, and criminal charges.12
Licensing laws may also limit the professional titles individuals can use when
representing themselves, like licensed dietitian (LD), certified dietitian (CD),
and certified nutritionist (CN).13
A. Free Speech Challenges to Nutritional Licensure: Lack of Guidance Creates
Legal Uncertainty
Healthcare professionals are required by statute to apply for and maintain
a license to practice in most states.14 While these statutes often provide
exceptions for other similarly situated medical providers whose scope of
practice naturally overlaps, an anticipated consequence of these licensing
statutes is the prohibition of practice for unlicensed individuals.15 For
nutrition and dietetics, that might mean if an unlicensed practitioner creates
a diet plan specifically to treat a disease or medical condition of another
person, they are breaking the law.16 Inevitably, tensions arise for those
people who want to represent themselves with protected nutrition
credentials, or whose unlicensed advice or scope of practice “creeps”17 into
12. See Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC, 7 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2019)
(listing the possible penalties for violating the dietetic licensure statute include imprisonment and fines).
13. See Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7, at 1562–63 (indicating statutes protecting only the use of
certain protected titles as providing the lowest level of consumer protection).
14. Currently forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have licensure
statutes governing nutrition and dietetic practice or the use of the professional titles “dietitian” and
“nutritionist.” See Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics: Licensure Statutes and Information by State,
EAT RIGHT PRO (July 2, 2018), https://www.eatrightpro.org/advocacy/licensure/licensure-map
[https://perma.cc/WB74-MN64] (providing a map detailing the different levels of licensure statutes
provided across the fifty states and the District of Columbia); Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics: Licensure
Information by State, EAT RIGHT PRO (Sept. 22, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Y8Q3-X262].
15. See Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, Consumer Protection Through Professional Regulation, Issue
Brief for Academy Members, EAT RIGHT PRO (Nov. 2018) [https://perma.cc/CU4Z-L383] (describing
the flexibility of dietetic licensure laws, which often permit non-dietitian medical professionals, such as
nurses and pharmacists, to legally provide nutrition information that falls within their scope of practice,
training, and qualifications).
16. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.504 (West 2019) (“No person may engage for remuneration in
dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling or hold himself or herself out as a practitioner
of dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling unless the person is licensed in accordance
with the provisions of this part.”).
17. In a medical setting, scope of practice defines the duties an individual health care provider
is permitted to perform in a specific profession. Assessing Scope of Practice in Health Care Delivery:
Critical Questions in Assuring Public Access and Safety, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. 4 (2005),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/assessing-scope-of-practice-in-health-care-deliv
ery.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8P2-YETC]. “Scope creep” occurs when a medical professional performs
duties outside their defined scope of practice; duties performed by a different and more appropriately
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the statutorily protected zone.18 These situations create opportunity for
litigation and licensing laws have been challenged on a variety of legal
grounds, but only a few cases have specifically dealt with First Amendment
challenges to nutrition and dietetics.19
Available scholarly legal literature specifically addressing nutrition and
dietetics licensing is scarce.20 There is also a notable lack of general judicial
direction regarding occupational licensing from the Supreme Court.21 A
lack of legal literature, judicial direction, and on-point caselaw, combined
with perhaps a misunderstanding of the medical implications of the
nutrition profession, have led courts to primarily compare challenges to
nutrition licensure statutes to challenges of similar laws governing nonmedical professions.22 Given the unique aspects of medical professions
and their particular impact on society, disastrous consequences could arise
from not applying the most appropriate caselaw.23 This Comment seeks to
address the gap of knowledge surrounding nutrition licensure statutes,
qualified professional. Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, Licensure and Professional Regulation of
Dietitians, EAT RIGHT PRO (2019), https://www.eatrightpro.org/advocacy/licensure/professionalregulation-of-dietitians [https://perma.cc/BL7H-PG5P].
18. See Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC, 2–3 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17,
2019) (describing the underlying plaintiff’s background as a holistic health coach undisputedly did not
satisfy the state licensure law, but nevertheless the plaintiff challenged the law as a violation of her free
speech rights).
19. Id. at 3; see also Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the plaintiff’s
underlying First Amendment rights were sufficiently chilled by the state board of dietetics and nutrition
as to warrant his legal action “ripe for adjudication”); Ohio Bd. of Dietetics v. Brown, 614 N.E.2d 855,
860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding the plaintiff’s underlying due process and freedom of religion claims
as meritless, and his actions were in violation of the state nutrition licensure statute); Strandwitz v.
Ohio Bd. of Dietetics, 614 N.E.2d 817, 824 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding the two clinical nutritionists
were not exempt from the state licensing requirements governing the practice of dietetics).
20. See Stephen A. Meli, Comment, Do You Have a License to Say That? Occupational Licensing and
Internet Speech, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 753, 754 (2014) (arguing speech including nutrition advice
should not be considered as engaging in professional speech).
21. Justice White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v. S.E.C. is one of the few resources from the
Supreme Court discussing occupational licensing. Sherman, supra note 9, at 184 (citing Lowe v. S.E.C.,
472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985)).
22. See Kevin Dayratna et al., Reforming American Medical Licensure, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
253, 257–58 (2019) (indicating a large focus on occupational licensing has been on non-health care
professions).
23. See Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 429 (1926) (holding statutes governing “locomotive
engineers and barbers . . . involve very different considerations from those relating to such
professions . . . requiring a high degree of scientific learning” such as “statutes regulating the practice
of medicine”); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043,
1055 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the state’s interest in regulating mental health more compelling than its
interest in regulating attorney solicitation, given the safety and health implications of the profession).
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putting aside any merited criticisms of occupational licensing in general,24
and establish why licensing laws governing medical professions like
nutrition and dietetics is, at minimum, a unique category worthy of
continued licensing.25 The purpose of this Comment is to provide the
following: (1) a foundation for understanding what nutrition and dietetics
is; (2) why nutrition licensing statutes exist; (3) how free speech challenges
to licensing laws have be made and interpreted; and (4) why medical
occupational licensing statutes should ultimately be enacted and upheld.
B. Comment Roadmap: Piecing Together the Puzzle to Arrive at Medical Nutrition
Therapy Incidentally Implicating Free Speech
This Comment is separated into two main subsequent parts and a
conclusion. The first part begins with a history of the nutrition and dietetics
profession, focusing on defining the medical nutrition therapy framework,
a general review of licensing statutes, and the different types of nutrition
and dietetic licensing. The second part is the crux of the Comment and
focuses on analyzing free speech challenges to medical occupational
licensure, with an emphasis on nutrition and dietetics. Within, an argument
is made for distinguishing medical licensure from non-medical licensure.
Two landmark Supreme Court cases are analyzed to interpret the central
issue involved in free speech challenges to licensure in general. A novel
approach to interpreting these free speech challenges is then described and
demonstrated using prior case law, and then again specifically with nutrition
and dietetic case law. Practical recommendations are then discussed for
continued enactment and enforcement of nutrition licensure laws before the
24. See Dayratna et al., supra note 22, at 253 (indicating the shortage of qualified physicians in
the United States is partially attributed to the restrictions imposed by medical licensure processes);
Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1104–06 (2014) (arguing licensing laws unfairly restrict competition and
providing examples describing the potential problems of State regulation); MORRIS M. KLEINER,
LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 8 (2006)
(suggesting restriction of lower-skilled applicants to practice through licensing laws has an uncertain
effect on quality of service).
25. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23 (1889) (emphasis added) (“Few professions
require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with
all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a
knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body in all its complicated
parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind . . . . Every one may
have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and
skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by
an authority competent to judge in that respect.”).
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overall conclusion. Ultimately, this Comment argues that nutritional
licensing laws which define medical nutrition therapy as the framework used
to diagnose and treat comorbidities only implicate free speech incidentally,
and merit at most rational basis scrutiny.
II. HISTORY OF DIETETICS AND BACKGROUND OF NUTRITION
AND DIETETICS LICENSURE
A. Nutrition and Dietetics in the United States and the Medical Nutrition Therapy
Framework
Dietetics has been informally recognized for centuries since the times of
Hippocrates and Plato, who each documented the vital relationship between
food and health.26 The United States was and has been largely influenced
by the steady shaping of the food and nutrition profession, which started
prominently in the United States Army.27 The nutrition and dietetics
profession began during the Spanish American War in 1898, when “dietists”
were responsible for managing wounded patients’ dietary intakes to help
improve recovery.28 Nutrition subsequently played a key role during World
War I and II when dietitians from the American Red Cross were hired as
staff at military hospitals; dietetics have been a mainstay in the United States
Military ever since.29 Key dietetic leaders would eventually meet and
develop the American Dietetic Association (now the Academy of Nutrition
and Dietetics) in 1917, the first major nutrition and dietetic organization in
the United States.30

26. PK Skiadas & JG Lascaratos, Dietetics in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Plato’s Concepts of Healthy
Diet, 55 EUR. J. OF CLINICAL NUTRITION 532, 532 (2001).
27. Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, Academy History Timeline, EAT RIGHT PRO (2019),
https://www.eatrightpro.org/history-timeline [https://perma.cc/WQ4Z-HSCS].
28. LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD F. LYNCH, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
ARMY DIETETICS 5 (1989).
29. Karen Stein, The Academy’s Military Roots Visualized, 114 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS
2023, 2032, 2034 (2014).
30. Id. at 2023.
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1. Occupational Licensing Academic and Professional Experience
Most Commonly Required for Registered Dietitians
In the United States, registered dietitians31 are recognized as the foremost
food and nutrition experts.32 Registered dietitians are the most commonly
cited nutrition professionals permitted by states to practice nutrition and
dietetics, and nutrition licensing laws often model their academic and
professional experience requirements.33 Registered dietitians are required
to have, at minimum: a bachelor’s degree from an accredited university;
completed coursework approved by the Accreditation Council for
Education in Nutrition and Dietetics (ACEND) of the Academy of
31. The correct spelling of dietitian, whether it is with a “t” or a “c” “has been a long-standing
matter for the profession of dietetics.” Wendy Marcason, Dietitian, Dietician, or Nutritionist?,
115 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 484, 484 (2015). Dietician, spelled with a “c”, is still a
dictionary-recognized alternate and admittedly a logical option considering the spelling of other
professions with the “cian” suffix (for example: physician, mathematician, musician, politician,
electrician, statistician, etc.). However, the International Committee of Dietetic Associations (ICDA)
standardized dietetic information under the International Standard Classification of Occupations in
1967 and “adopted the spelling dietitian at the request of the international dietetic community” as the
correct and preferred spelling. Id. The internationally accepted spelling requested by professionals in
the field of dietetics is dietitian, spelled with a “t.” In respect to that community and to avoid confusion,
dietitian will be used in this Comment except when necessary to quote or cite an authority.
32. Committee on Nutrition Services for Medicare Beneficiaries, The Role of Nutrition in
Maintaining Health in the Nation’s Elderly: Evaluating Coverage of Nutrition Services for the Medicare Population,
8 (2000) (determining registered dietitians are “the single identifiable group [of health-care
professionals] with standardized education, clinical training, continuing education, and national
credentialing requirements necessary to be directly reimbursed as a provider of nutrition therapy”);
Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, What Is a Registered Dietitian Nutritionist, EAT RIGHT PRO,
https://www.eatrightpro.org/about-us/what-is-an-rdn-and-dtr/what-is-a-registered-dietitian-nutritio
nist [https://perma.cc/TKZ4-VAE2] [hereinafter What Is a Registered Dietitian Nutritionist].
33. Of the forty-seven states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico that have licensure statutes
governing nutrition and dietetic practice or regulate the use of the professional titles “dietitian” and
“nutritionist,” all of them cite registered dietitians as a medical professional credential authorized to
practice or use the titles. See Consumer Protection Through Professional Regulation, supra note 15 (providing
a map detailing the different levels of licensure statutes provided across the 50 states and the District
of Columbia); Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, supra note 14. The Certified Nutrition Specialist
(CNS) and Diplomate of the American Clinical Board of Nutrition (DACBN) are two other less
common professional credentials that have been cited as authorized to practice by state nutrition and
dietetic licensure statutes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.509 (West 2019) (listing registered dietitians,
registered dietitian nutritionists, certified nutrition specialists, and diplomates of the American Clinical
Board of Nutrition as meeting the qualifications of the nutrition and dietetics licensure statute).
The CNS is administered by the Board for Certification of Nutrition Specialists as part of the American
Nutrition Association, and the DACBN is administered by the American Clinical Board of Nutrition.
About the BCNS, AM. NUTRITION ASS’N, https://theana.org/certify/aboutBCNS [https://
perma.cc/MKC8-FPSX]; Welcome to the ACBN, AM. CLINICAL BD. OF NUTRITION, https://
www.acbn.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/FJ6G-YJQR].
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Nutrition and Dietetics (AND); performed 1200 supervised practice hours,
typically done in a dietetic internship; passed the national registration exam
administered by the Commission on Dietetic Registration (CDR), and
satisfied recurring professional education requirements.34 Both federal and
state governments select the criteria to obtain a license to practice medical
nutrition therapy.35
2. Medical Nutrition Therapy: The Framework Dietitians Use to
Diagnose and Treat Medical Comorbidities
Medical nutrition therapy is defined as “nutritional diagnostic, therapy,
and counseling services for the purpose of disease management which are
furnished by a registered dietitian or nutrition professional [for the purpose
of managing disease].”36 This practice method involves the systematic
application of the Nutrition Care Process framework: an interconnected,
multi-step, evidence-based, and individualized nutrition care treatment to
manage a person’s nutrition-related comorbidities.37 The Nutrition Care
Process steps involve: (1) gathering, analyzing, and interpreting relevant
data; (2) selecting a nutrition diagnosis based on identified nutrition
problems, etiologies, and clinical signs and symptoms; (3) determining
achievable and measurable goals and their associated nutrition prescription
and interventions to resolve the nutrition diagnosis; and (4) examining
progress and results of nutrition interventions and implementing
reassessment as needed.38 The Nutrition Care Process is evidence-based39
34. What is a Registered Dietitian Nutritionist, supra note 32.
35. See Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7, at 1561 (reporting state nutrition licensure statutes almost
uniformly mirror the qualifications required to be a registered dietitian nutritionist, and reporting
Medicare requires similar qualifications for providing medical nutrition therapy); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(vv)(2) (2018) (defining the academic and experience requirements for a “registered dietitian or
nutrition professional” under Medicare).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(vv)(1) (2018); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640E.050 (West 2019)
(“‘Medical nutrition therapy’ means the use of nutrition services by a licensed dietitian to manage, treat
or rehabilitate a disease, illness, injury or medical condition of a patient.”).
37. See William L. Swan et al., Nutrition Care Process and Model Update: Toward Realizing PeopleCentered Care and Outcomes Management, 117 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 2003, 2003 (2017)
(describing the Nutrition Care Process as a four-step interconnected model using standardized
terminology to describe and document individualized nutrition care, consisting of nutrition
assessment/reassessment, diagnosis, intervention, and monitoring and evaluation).
38. Id. at 2004–09.
39. Specifically, the Nutrition Care Process is supported through the use of the Evidence
Analysis Library, a repository of updated and relevant nutrition research. Academy of Nutrition and
Dietetics, About the Evidence Analysis Library, EAT RIGHT, https://www.andeal.org/about [https://
perma.cc/2NSJ-NESC]; see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
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and provides a consistent, quality based care to improve patient health
outcomes.40
B. Background and Justification for Medical Licensing Laws Generally: Protecting
the Public
Occupational licensing is state regulation of the entry into and practice of
a given profession.41 Licensing laws require individuals to meet stateestablished minimum competency levels for education and experience in
order to receive a license to practice in the state.42 The statute often creates
a licensing board to oversee the occupation’s regulation, responsible for
evaluating qualifications of professional applicants, establishing a code of
professional ethics, forming criteria required for relicensing, and imposing
penalties for violating the statute.43
The ability to enact licensing laws has historically been attributed to fall
within states’ sovereign police power.44 Caveat emptor predominantly
regulated the medical profession prior to licensing laws emerging in the late
1800s.45 States began recognizing the increased need to protect public
health, and by 1905 almost all states had enacted a medical licensing scheme
regulating who could practice medicine.46 Similar laws regulating other
professions emerged after a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court held
in favor of such laws, and the establishment of licensing boards to enforce
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at 10 (William C. Richardson et al. eds., 2001) (emphasizing
evidence-based practice is essential for delivering quality health care in a safe, effective, patientcentered, timely, efficient, and equitable manner).
40. See Kyle L. Thompson, et al., Nutrition Care Process Chains: The “Missing Link” between Research
and Evidence-Based Practice, 115 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS, 1491, 1491 (2015) (detailing the
framework and chains incorporated within the Nutrition Care Process, which establish the critical link
between research and the measurable quality of nutrition care provided).
41. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 189, 191 (2000).
42. Id.
43. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.517–18 (West 2019) (describing the board’s power to deny
licensure to applicants, impose penalties on current licensees, and identify individuals in violation of
the statute generally).
44. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494, 1119 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(detailing the history of state regulation over the practice of medicine and the establishment of medical
boards as falling with the states’ sovereign police power); Paul J. Larkin Jr., Public Choice Theory and
Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 279–80 (2016) (detailing the history of judicial
review of economic legislation enacted pursuant to state police powers).
45. Michelle Poncetta, Note, Against Licensing Non-Invasive Complementary and Alternative
Treatments: An Ineffective and Harmful Measure for Consumer Protection, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661,
663–64 (2013).
46. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 110 (1982).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 1

1192

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1181

them.47 Occupational licensing laws have been enacted rapidly since,
however, a significant focus has been on non-health care professions.48
State licensing for nutrition and dietetics is relatively new in comparison
to other medical licensing schemes.49 The justification for such schemes,
however, is essentially the same and medical licensing statutes are justified
primarily for several compelling reasons. First, citizens deserve to have
access to competent, safe, ethical, and efficacious medical information and
therapies.50 Second, citizens should have access to a state-specific list of
statutorily qualified individuals who possess the standardized education and
experience the state has deemed necessary for professionals who wish to
practice in the state.51 Finally, medical licensure statutes protect the public
against people who offer unscientific, non-validated and harmful advice,
which if unchecked could lead to dangerous health outcomes and potentially
unnecessary and expensive products and services.52

47. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 519–20 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing
the timeline of significant holdings related to the states’ ability to license physicians and to staff state
licensing boards); see also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 118 (1889) (holding the state-licensure
law a valid exercise of state authority because it was made to ensure the profession of medicine could
be trusted by the community to practice with a certain level of skill, knowledge, and qualifications);
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898) (holding “it is not the province of the courts” to
question state legislature’s determinations regarding established qualifications specified in state
licensure laws).
48. See KLEINER, supra note 24, at 1 (indicating only 4.5% of the U.S. labor force was governed
by state licensing laws in the 1950s); Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and
Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S176 (2013) (estimating 29%
of workers required licensing as of 2008, with future growth expected).
49. “Texas was the first state to enact a licensing scheme for nutrition and dietetics, in 1983.”
Sherman, supra note 9, at 192, n65; Licensed Dietician Act, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 307, 1983 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1617, [https://perma.cc/48NF-YGYM] (current version at TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 701).
50. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 34-34A-2 (West 2019) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the public by providing for the licensing and regulation of persons
engaged in the practice of dietetics and nutrition.”).
51. See TEX. OCC. § 701.1511 (“The department shall prepare a registry of licensed dietitians
and provisional licensed dietitians and make the registry available to the public, license holders, and
appropriate state agencies.”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 5-205 (West 2013) (“[T]he [State]
Board shall: (1) Keep a list of all dietitian-nutritionists who are currently licensed[.]”).
52. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-1205.01 (West 2015) (“A license issued pursuant to this chapter is
required to practice . . . dietetics[.]”); see also Grp. Health Ass’n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C.
1938) (“It is evident that the purpose of the statute was to protect the public from quacks, from the
ignorant and incompetent.”).
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C. The Different Licensing Laws Currently Enacted for Nutrition and Dietetics in
the United States and What They Do to Protect the Public
State regulation of nutrition and dietetics, not to be confused with the
registration or credentialing often required for medical professionals, has
generally been crafted to provide one of three degrees of regulation.53 The
highest degree of regulation, often simply called licensure, establishes three
components: (1) practice exclusivity, which completely proscribes unlicensed
individuals from providing the nutrition and dietetics services defined in the
statute’s scope of practice; (2) state certification, where a state agency provides
a state license to individuals meeting specific qualifications; and (3) title
protection, which prohibits unlicensed individuals from using titles specified
in the statute.54 The next degree of regulation requires both state
certification and title protection, but not practice exclusivity.55 Finally, the
lowest degree of regulation provides only title protection and fails to
establish either practice exclusivity or any specified qualifications required
for practicing in the State.56
Each degree of regulation has associated implications on the ability to
practice nutrition and dietetics. Licensure, which includes practice
exclusivity, provides the most public protection to state communities,
workplaces, and individuals by establishing an objective standard for the
education and experience required for professionals to convey nutrition
53. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 48, at S175 (describing the three forms of regulation
typically observed with occupational licensing as licensure, certification, and registration); Phillips &
Tuma, supra note 7, at 1562 (describing how state regulation of nutrition and dietetics generally takes
one of three forms: licensure, state certification, or title protection only).
54. See Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7, at 1562 (referencing the figure depicting the differing
degrees of regulation, indicating “licensure with practice exclusivity” as the broadest type).
55. See id. at 1562 (defining state certification regulations as providing state recognition to
certain practitioners and establishing title protection, but not prohibiting unqualified people from
practicing within the state).
56. See id. (describing title protection regulations currently enacted in three states); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 2585 (West 2019) (“Any person representing himself or herself as a registered dietitian
shall meet one of the following qualifications[.]”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-707 (West 2019)
(“A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of such person’s business,
vocation, or occupation, such person: . . . Claims either orally or in writing to be a ‘dietitian’, ‘dietician’,
‘certified dietitian’, or ‘certified dietician’ or uses the abbreviation ‘C.D.’ or ‘D.’ to indicate that such
person is a dietitian, unless such person [meets state specified qualifications.]”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2731 (West 2017) (“No person shall hold himself out to be . . . a dietitian or nutritionist unless
such person” meets state specified qualifications. “The restrictions of this section apply to the use of
the terms ‘dietitian’ and ‘nutritionist’ as used alone or in any combination with the terms ‘licensed,’
‘certified,’ or ‘registered,’ as those terms also imply a minimum level of education, training and
competence.”).
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advice, consultations, and interventions within state borders.57 The statute
by its nature limits the variety of individuals permitted to practice within the
state; individuals who do not meet the established standards for professional
competence violate state law if they practice without a license.58 Licensure
is often criticized as the state limiting market competition and infringing
upon citizen’s freedom of speech.59 State certification statutes without
practicing exclusivity ensure certified individuals using state-specified titles
have specific qualifications; however, uncertified individuals may still
practice nutrition and dietetics within the state as long as they do not
represent themselves with the state-regulated titles.60 State certification
statutes provide a diminished level of consumer protection—requiring
consumers to bear the burden of determining the credibility of uncertified
individuals—but allow more individuals to practice nutrition and dietetics.
Finally, title protection without established standards of practice provides
minimal consumer protection in exchange for greater ability to practice
within the state; use of certain titles is regulated but there are no associated
standards established for using those titles, requiring consumers to
determine for themselves whether the nutrition provider has satisfactory
experience and qualifications.61 Some states currently have no nutrition
licensing law in place, which allows maximum flexibility for individuals who
want to practice nutrition and dietetics, but provides zero consumer
protection. Anyone can represent themselves within the state as having the
same credentials that are regulated in other states to bolster the appearance

57. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640E.010 (West 2021) (“The Legislature hereby declares that
the practice of dietetics is a learned profession affecting the safety, health and welfare of the public and
is subject to regulation to protect the public from the practice of dietetics by unqualified and unlicensed
persons and from unprofessional conduct by persons licensed to practice dietetics.”).
58. See id. § 640E.370 (“A person who violates any provision of this chapter or any regulation
adopted pursuant thereto is guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
59. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 24, at 1095–96 (comparing state professional licensing boards
to cartels and arguing such boards should not be exempt from the Sherman Act);
Sherman, supra note 9, at 183–84 (advocating occupational speech licensing laws should be challenged
as violations of free speech and subject to strict scrutiny analysis).
60. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.138.020 (West 2021) (limiting the ability for people to
represent themselves as a certified dietitian or nutritionist unless certified by the State, and limiting the
use of the designations, “‘Certified dietitian,’ ‘certified dietician,’ ‘certified nutritionist,’ ‘D.,’ ‘C.D.,’ or
‘C.N.’”).
61. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2730 (West 2021) (“Nothing in this chapter shall preclude or
affect in any fashion the ability of any person to provide any assessment, evaluation, advice, counseling,
information or services of any nature that are otherwise allowed by law[.]”).
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of their qualifications, even if those representations are unsubstantiated or
invalid.62
III. FREE SPEECH CHALLENGES TO NUTRITION AND
DIETETICS LICENSURE
Enactment of occupational licensure laws is not without limitation. State
police power is necessarily bound, to a varying degree, when in conflict with
the Federal or State Constitution or other federal law.63 However,
successful challenges under such grounds to state licensing schemes are
difficult to maintain.64 Complicating matters, the Supreme Court has
historically expressed hesitancy to disturb state legislative decisions
regarding management of medical professions and professionals.65 This
hesitancy is understandable, as medical professions have a considerable
impact on the public that other professions do not.66 However, the lack of
guidance has led lower courts to rely on case law regarding licensure of nonmedical professions when considering modern challenges to nutrition
licensure statutes, rather than cases involving medical professions.67 Given
the fundamental differences behind the rationale for establishing licensing
schemes for medical professions versus other professions, and the relevant
62. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.183a (repealed 2014) (previously establishing a state
certification statute governing nutrition and dietetics); see also Consumer Protection Through Professional
Regulation, EAT RIGHT 1, 3 (Nov. 2018), https://www.eatrightpro.org/-/media/eatrightpro-files/
advocacy/licensure/consumerprotectionissuebrief.pdf?la=en&hash=06D3D9A14B389986FC17071
E2E4ABDD6AAAA1B5F [https://perma.cc/B3CG-8PAZ] (depicting Michigan, Arizona, and New
Jersey as not having any statutes regulating nutrition and dietetic practice).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“The Constitution created a Federal
Government of limited powers. . . . The States thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our
constitutional system.”).
64. See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 280 (indicating Supreme Court precedent does not favor
challengers of occupational licensing laws if challenging on federal constitutional grounds).
65. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Even during the Lochner era, when this Court struck down numerous economic
regulations concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative judgments
concerning the medical profession.”).
66. See Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 429 (1926) (holding statutes governing “locomotive
engineers and barbers . . . involve very different considerations from those relating to such
professions . . . requiring a high degree of scientific learning,” such as “statutes regulating the practice
of medicine”).
67. See generally Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17,
2019) (citing cases involving interior designers and tour guides along with cases involving physicians
and medical clinics).
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history establishing medical licensure as the foundation for occupational
licensing, reliance on non-medical case law is misapplied when used
exclusively.68
Legal challenges to occupational licensing of nutrition and dietetics have
recently been brought under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.69 Analyzing Supreme Court and select lower court cases
considering challenges specifically to medical licensing schemes helps
elucidate how courts should interpret such challenges to nutrition and
dietetics licensure, as the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly done so.70
A. Framing the Free Speech Issue: Occupational Licensure Only Incidentally
Implicates Free Speech
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States
via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”71 But freedom of speech is not
absolute. Speech merits less protection when it is incidental to the
regulation of professional conduct.72 Outside of these exceptions and
categories of speech historically exempt from First Amendment protection,
content-neutral and content-based laws regulating speech are subject to
heightened scrutiny.73 Content-neutral laws impose a burden on speech
68. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043,
1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the State’s interest in regulating mental health is more compelling than
its interest in regulating attorney solicitation, “given the health and safety implications” of the
profession).
69. See Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 68
(2016) (reviewing the surge of First Amendment challenges and the development of the “professional
speech” doctrine prior to Becerra).
70. See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 848 (2019) (indicating
“lower courts have adopted a hodgepodge of approaches” considering the lack of Supreme Court
guidance); Sherman, supra note 9 (describing the lack of Supreme Court direction as having profound
and conflicting consequences on lower court rulings).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
72. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (holding a physician’s
right not to speak is implicated only to the extent the speech is “part of the practice of medicine, subject
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State”).
73. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (listing “permitted restrictions
upon the content of speech” as “including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral
to criminal conduct”) (citations omitted); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs.. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2371 (2018) (distinguishing content-based regulations of speech as requiring strict scrutiny
analysis); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (holding intermediate scrutiny
appropriately “applicable to content-neutral [free speech] restrictions that impose an incidental burden
on speech”).
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without regard to specific views or ideas and are subject to intermediate
scrutiny.74 Content-based laws “are presumptively unconstitutional” and
subject to strict scrutiny, as such laws usually grant the power to suppress
speech with specific content or speech representing a particular point of
view.75
An important distinction to make when considering free speech
challenges to occupational licensure is the level of scrutiny applied.76 A
long line of Supreme Court precedent has firmly held the entry into a
medical profession, gated by a state occupational licensing statute, is
absolutely subordinate to the control of the State pursuant to the exercise
of its police powers.77 Licensing laws in this vein may then at most should
only inhibit free speech incidentally as part of an otherwise legitimate
licensing scheme, meriting rational basis review, if held to implicate free
74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (1994); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
375, 377 (1968) (holding governmental regulation sufficiently justified when incidentally restricting free
speech if it “furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . no greater than is essential”
and if the interest is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”). The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently applied O’Brien in a First Amendment challenge
to a licensing scheme regulating tour guides. Edwards v. D.C., 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This
appears to be the first application of the O’Brien test to an occupational licensing statute aimed at
regulating professional conduct which incidentally impacts free speech. While the O’Brien test is applied
to laws which seek to control conduct that communicates—which necessarily involves speech and
non-speech components—this is likely not an appropriate instance to use it. See O’Brien, 391 U.S.
at 376 (rejecting the argument that conduct can be classified only as speech when made symbolically
to express an idea). The regulated conduct typically at issue in occupational licensing schemes is
generally not regulated because of its expressive nature, if such a nature exists at all, therefore the
O’Brien test may be misapplied if used to evaluate similar challenges to occupational licensure. See Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (holding the O’Brien test applicable when
evaluating regulations of symbolic expression, or “conduct that is intended to be communicative”).
75. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015); see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642
(holding the “principal inquiry” in deciding whether a regulation is content-neutral or content-based
“is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement
with the message it conveys”) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)));
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate [speech] based on
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”).
76. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing the level of First Amendment scrutiny applied to licensing laws which
regulate entry into a profession and may prompt at most rational basis scrutiny versus laws that regulate
speech once a professional is licensed, which should require more heightened scrutiny).
77. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“States have a compelling interest
in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the
public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596
(1926) (“[T]here is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the
states.”).
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speech at all.78 However, once the state licenses a professional a more
complicated analysis ensues, possibly requiring intermediate or strict
scrutiny analysis.79
The importance of determining when speech is made incidental to
professional conduct, and thus meriting less First Amendment protection,
climaxed after the Supreme Court’s holding in National Institute of Family and
Life Advocates v. Becerra.80 By rejecting the professional speech doctrine,81
78. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (“[U]nder our precedents, States may regulate professional
conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech.”); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (concluding licensing provisions do not place a limitation on freedom of
speech when there is a “personal nexus between the professional and client” because “the
professional’s speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession”); Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185,
1191 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding occupational licensing statute is not unconstitutional as a violation of
free speech “so long as any inhibition of that right is merely the incidental effect of observing an
otherwise legitimate regulation” (quoting Accts. Soc. of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir.
1988))); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding generally applicable
licensing schemes limiting persons who may practice the profession do not enact a limitation on the
freedom of speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
79. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (holding the professional speech doctrine is not a recognized
category of speech protected by the First Amendment outside of permissibly regulated commercial
speech and professional conduct that incidentally involves speech, rendering such speech is subject to
more heightened scrutiny).
80. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). See id. at 2371
(rejecting the notion of “‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to
different [First Amendment] rules”).
81. Until Becerra, “professional speech” was established as a new category of speech subject to
lesser First Amendment scrutiny, recognized in at least the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. See King
v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying the professional speech doctrine in
holding “a licensed professional does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment when
speaking as part of the practice of her profession”); Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d
560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding “[u]nder the professional speech doctrine, the government can
license and regulate” fortune tellers “without running afoul of the First Amendment”); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2014) (establishing different levels of scrutiny for
professional speech when made to the public, when made “within the confines of a professional
relationship,” and when made incidentally as part of professional conduct). However, the Supreme
Court in Becerra explicitly rejected to recognize professional speech as a separate, special category of
speech without further justification for such a distinction, specifically abrogating King, Moore-King, and
Pickup. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371, 2375 (holding none of the Court’s precedents recognize
professional speech as a separate category of speech warranting lesser First Amendment scrutiny and
the government failed to provide any compelling reason to do so but remained open to “the possibility
that such reason exists”). Professional speech prior to Becerra was deemed any speech made by
professionals based on their expert judgment and knowledge, with professionals defined as those who
provide personalized services and are subject to a state regulated licensing scheme. Id. at 2371–72.
This category was created drawing significantly from the logic espoused in Justice Jackson’s and White’s
concurrences and because of the lack of guidance since Thomas and Lowe. See King, 767 F.3d at 231
(explaining “the Fourth Circuit drew heavily from the concurrences in Thomas and Lowe in holding that
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the Court firmly established that speech made outside of what is incidental
to professional conduct is subject to heightened scrutiny.82 Determining
when speech becomes merely incidental to professional conduct is further
compounded when a profession is largely based on speech.83 For nutrition
and dietetics, licensure both regulates the entry into the profession while
simultaneously imposing practice exclusivity, prohibiting non-licensed
professionals from engaging in medical nutrition therapy, which necessarily
involves speech.84 No clear standard has been identified or offered to
determine at what point any speech becomes “professional conduct” for
medical professions, subject to the state’s police powers under a licensing
scheme.85
‘professional speech’ does not receive full protection under the First Amendment”). See generally
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985). Important to note was
the limited applicability of the professional speech analysis to free speech challenges. Professional
speech focused on the speech made by professionals who were already licensed and later subjected to
a statute impacting their free speech rights, rather than statutes establishing a state regulated licensing
requirement that incidentally implicates speech. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371, 2376 (analyzing the two
different plaintiff’s challenges separately, as the statute in question both implicated facilities employing
licensed providers and facilities employing only unlicensed providers).
82. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. The Court also recognized commercial speech as another
category receiving more deferential review. See id. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary
Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)).
83. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (distinguishing the
difference between the state’s exercise of the power to mandate professional licensure against the
state’s ability to regulate anyone’s speech to the general public); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J.,
concurring) (suggesting the application of a licensure law to unlicensed professionals who publicly
publish articles would be “a direct restraint on freedom of speech”); Smolla, supra note 69, at 106
(opining on instances in which professional licensing statutes would violate the First Amendment);
Sherman, supra note 9, at 199 (criticizing licensing statutes which impose a burden on speech but might
be upheld as otherwise valid licensing laws).
84. See Swan et al., supra note 37, at 2008 (describing steps which incidentally require speech
while providing medical nutrition therapy through the Nutrition Care Process as including but not
limiting to: client interviewing, communicating and collaborating with the client on the nutrition care
plan, checking client understanding, and communicating during monitoring and evaluation); Coleman,
supra note 70, at 844 (including counseling on diet and lifestyle changes for patients with heart disease
as a communicative medical intervention).
85. See Brown, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(criticizing the majority for providing “no principled doctrinal basis for its dichotomy” in holding
certain verbal communication by mental health providers as professional conduct, and questioning:
“By what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’ on the one hand, and
those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2384–85
(holding permissible the regulation of professional conduct that incidentally implicates speech, such as
“part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” (emphasis
added) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992))).
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1. History Distinguishes Medical Professions in Particular as Subject
to State Licensing Because of Their Impact on Public Safety
Occupational licensing statutes governing medical professions, enacted
pursuant to state police power, have been held constitutionally valid for over
a century.86 But the origins of legal challenges to these statutes allege
violations of due process, not free speech.87 Despite this, the Court’s
guidance provided in these challenges helps identify why medical licensing,
to include nutrition and dietetic licensure, is a unique category worthy of
state regulation.88
Analyzing the evolution of judicial review on the limitations of state
police power often starts with the landmark case Lochner v. New York.89 The
Court in Lochner considered a New York law that limited the total number
of hours a baker could work to sixty hours per week, enacted for the health,
safety, and general welfare of bakers in the baking industry.90 Unpersuaded
by the State’s offered rationale, the Court held the statute an
unconstitutional use of the State’s police power, as it deprived bakers of the
right to contract and did not substantially involve the safety, welfare, or
morals of the general public.91 Lochner was decided in 1905 and would serve
86. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23 (1889) (holding occupational licensing of
physicians as a constitutionally valid use of state police power). Dent is commonly cited as the first
Supreme Court case dealing with medical occupational licensing. See Ray A. Brown, Police Power—
Legislation for Health and Personal Safety, 4 HARV. L. REV. 866, 875 (1929) (citing Dent as the earliest case
holding state police power regulating health and public safety through occupational licensing valid, and
specifically noting “not a single dissenting vote has been cast” in the seven cases before the Court
dealing with occupational licensing of medical professions).
87. See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 282–84 (detailing the origin of judicial review of state police
powers stems from due process challenges to economic legislation like occupational licensing statutes).
88. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 127, 128 (holding state regulation and licensing of physicians in order
to protect public health and safety as a reasonable limitation to the constitutional right to pursue an
occupation); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898) (“It is, no one can doubt, of high
importance to the community that health, limb, and life should not be left to the treatment of ignorant
pretenders and charlatans.” (quoting Eastman v. State, 10 N.E. 97 (1887))); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S.
505, 506 (1903) (holding in the opening line of the opinion, “The power of a state to make reasonable
provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine, of those
[engaging] in the practice of medicine, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance
of such statutory provisions, is not open to question.”); Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 2877–79 (describing
the existence of both pre and post-Lochner rulings upholding state occupational licensing statutes for
medical professions and noting this consistency at least distinguishes medical licensure as “unique” and
“particularly well fit for regulation”).
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 248 (explaining
Lochner is a common starting point for most reviews of economic legislation).
90. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52, 53.
91. Id. at 57.
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as the premier example of the judicially imposed limits to state police power
until the New Deal era of cases arrived.92
The Court changed views on the limits to state police power—perhaps in
light of the Great Depression and the state and federal government’s
attempts to revitalize the economy—almost thirty years after Lochner in a
line of cases starting with Nebbia v. New York.93 In Nebbia, New York
imposed price fixing on the minimum and maximum prices for selling milk,
to protect both farmers from economic losses and the public from potential
decreases in quality control that might result if farmers became unable to
finance the safe production and handling of milk.94 The Court, noting the
long history of state regulation of the milk industry as significant, deviated
from Lochner and held under a rational basis review the statute did not violate
due process.95 Since Nebbia, the Court has been reluctant to reconsider the
limitations to a state’s police power and has not returned to a Lochner-era
type of review.96
The Lochner and post-Lochner cases pose an insightful timeline to consider
in the backdrop of the then-decided medical licensure cases.97 The Court
92. See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 251 (naming Lochner the “poster boy” of the Court’s stance
on state police power until cases arising from the New Deal arrived).
93. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 251–52.
94. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 516–17 (explaining the essential impact milk had on public health and
the economic prosperity of New York State, and the difficulties experienced by farmers in preventing
bacterial contamination amidst the economic downturn).
95. Id. at 537 (“The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio.”).
96. See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 248, 255 (describing the last seventy years of Supreme Court
holdings as “construing the external limitations on Congress’s power . . . rather than analyzing whether
there are internal limitations governing how far a particular grant of authority may reach”).
97. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding a generally applied state
license requirement for physicians); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (holding valid the
moral qualifications requirement of a state license requirement for physicians); Reetz v. Michigan,
188 U.S. 505, 506 (1903) (upholding the state’s creation of a licensing board to enforce identified
requirements of the state physician licensing statute); Watson v. Maryland, 217 U.S. 173, 177 (1910)
(“It is too well settled to require discussion at this day that the police power of the states extends to
the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the public
health.”); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 429 (1926) (upholding the state licensing requirement for
dentists); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (stating “[t]he day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought” in holding permissible a state statute regulating the
conduct of optometrists, ophthalmologists, and opticians).
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held unanimously in favor of the State’s enactment of occupational licensing
in a series of challenges during the years leading up to Lochner, holding such
laws and the establishment of state licensing boards to enforce them as
constitutional.98 Despite the Court’s holding in Lochner, challenges to state
occupational licensing statutes around that time continued to be viewed as
a valid exercise of state police power.99 This trend expectedly continued
after the Court’s holding in Nebbia.100 This consistency is revealing of the
unique nature of medical licensing: cases decided in the wake of Lochner but
before Nebbia were not interpreted differently from the pre-Lochner line,
despite the stark interpretive differences observed in Lochner and Nebbia.101
As such, the Court’s holdings from Dent v. West Virginia,102 Reetz v.
Michigan,103 and the cases that followed are “still good law” with respect to
the validity of occupational licensing of medical professions.104 The direct
applicability of these cases may be duly limited due to their holdings being
decided on different constitutional grounds. But the Supreme Court’s
unflinchingly rigid language in these cases is highly persuasive and cannot
be ignored by courts considering similar challenges to occupational licensing
brought under the First Amendment.
First, in Dent, the Court considered a due process challenge to West
Virginia’s licensing statute regulating the qualifications required to receive a

98. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 128 (holding in favor of state licensing of physicians sixteen years
before Lochner); Hawker, 170 U.S. at 200 (holding in favor of the state license requirement for
physicians seven years before Lochner); Reetz, 188 U.S. at 506 (holding valid the state’s creation of a
licensing board two years before Lochner); Brown, supra note 86, at 875 (highlighting “not a single
dissenting vote has been cast” in the seven cases decided by the Supreme Court dealing with
occupational licensing of medical professions).
99. See Watson, 217 U.S. at 177 (holding in favor of a state licensing requirement for physicians
five years after Lochner); see also Grave, 272 U.S. at 429 (holding in favor of the state licensing requirement
for dentists twenty-one years after Lochner and eight years before Nebbia).
100. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487, 490 (holding valid the state licensing requirement
differentiating permissible conduct between optometrists, ophthalmologists, and opticians twenty-one
years after Nebbia).
101. Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 280 (describing the timeline of pre- and post-Lochner rulings as
demonstrating the unique consistency of the Supreme Court in holding the enactment of medical
licensing statutes as a valid use of state police power).
102. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
103. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
104. Dent, 129 U.S. at 121 (“But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise
is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection
of society.”); Reetz, 188 U.S. at 506 (discussing the validity of using state powers to create a licensure
board); Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 279 (explaining the remaining validity of these cases).
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state certificate to practice medicine.105 The Court specifically noted the
unique characteristics of the medical profession and why state regulation
was particularly needed, stating:
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter
it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious
influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a
knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the
human body in all its complicated parts . . . . Every[one] may have occasion
to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of
learning and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the
assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in
that respect.106

The Court further explained that such licensing was subject to change in
anticipation of future knowledge requiring it, specifically noting “the properties
of vegetable and mineral substances” and the agencies by which the human system
is affected.107 Concluding, the Court held the licensing requirement lacked
all intent to deprive citizens of any rights.108 Two years before Lochner the
Court decided Reetz.109 In Reetz, the Court quickly established Dent as
controlling precedent, holding at the onset “[t]he power of a state to make
reasonable provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging
in the practice of medicine, and punishing those who attempt to engage
therein in defiance of such statutory provisions, is not open to question.”110
Applying Dent to the challenge at hand, the Court considered the
establishment of a state licensing board to discharge the state’s licensing
duties as a valid exercise of due process.111

105. Dent, 129 U.S. at 121.
106. Id. at 122–23.
107. See id. at 123 (explaining “the same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon
compliance with which the physician is allowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further
conditions as new modes of treating disease are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is
obtained of the remedial properties of vegetable and mineral substances, or a more accurate knowledge is
acquired of the human system and of the agencies by which it is affected ”) (emphasis added).
108. See id. (“We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature
to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the
necessary qualifications of learning and skill[.]”).
109. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
110. See id. at 506 (emphasis added) (citing Dent and Hawker approvingly).
111. See id. at 508 (“It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance
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The cases post-Lochner contain equally powerful and illuminating
language and perhaps are more persuasive given the Court’s opinion in
Lochner.112 The Court held in favor of another challenge to state licensing
of physicians in Watson v. Maryland 113 only five years after Lochner. In
Watson, the state licensing statute was challenged as a violation of equal
protection because the statute permitted exceptions to certain classes of
individuals but not others.114 The post-Lochner Court maintained the same
view of medical licensing statutes, holding “the police power of the states
extends to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those
which closely concern the public health. There is perhaps no profession more
properly open to such regulation than that which embraces the practitioners of
medicine.”115 The Court explained the medical community’s link to public
health clearly warranted state regulation to ensure only qualified
professionals were permitted to practice.116 Given the clear delineation of
duties split between the legislature enacting such regulations and the
judiciary consistently recognizing this power as permissible, the Court’s
opinion was resultingly concise in holding the statute did not deny equal
protection of the law.117 The Court extended this holding to dentistry in
Graves v. Minnesota.118 In doing so, the Court reiterated the vital link
between safeguarding public health and the power of the state to regulate
medical professions, explaining “it has been the practice of different States,
from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and

of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be
held to be due process of law.”) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884)).
112. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding the state insufficiently justified
the use of police power to regulate the baking industry by unreasonably favoring one group of
individuals over another).
113. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
114. See id. at 178–79 (including exceptions for individuals providing gratuitous services,
residents or students working under physician supervision, any physician from another state who was
consulting with an in-state physician, chiropodists, midwives, physicians treating in-state patients but
residing out-of-state, and commissioned surgeons of the Army, Navy, or Marines).
115. Id. at 176–77 (emphasis added).
116. See id. at 178–79 (“Dealing, as its followers do, with the lives and health of the people, and
requiring for its successful practice general education and technical skill, as well as good character,
[medicine] is obviously one of those vocations where the power of the state may be exerted to see that
only properly qualified persons shall undertake its responsible and difficult duties.”).
117. See id. (“Conceding the power of the legislature to make regulations of this character . . . the
details of such legislation rest primarily within the discretion of the state legislature. . . . This subject
has been so frequently and recently before this court as not to require an extended consideration.”).
118. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
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learning upon which the community may confidently rely.”119 In upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court notably explained the different
facets each occupation entailed must be considered when evaluating the
permissibility of the state statutory schemes of different professions.120
The Court explicitly clarified “employments or trades of locomotive
engineers and barbers[] . . . [manifestly] involve very different
considerations from those relating to such professions as dentistry requiring
a high degree of scientific learning.”121 In Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma Inc.,122 the Court further explained the legislative consideration
of these factors merits significant leniency. In Williamson, the Court
considered an Oklahoma statute which required a prescription from an
optometrist or ophthalmologist in order for an optician to fit or duplicate
lenses for eyewear.123 The district court found the statute “neither
reasonably necessary nor reasonably related to the end” of protecting public
health and welfare.124 The Supreme Court overruled the district court,
citing the responsibility of the judiciary necessitates deference be given to
the legislature to “balance the advantages and disadvantages” of the
regulation, despite it producing obvious duplicative and illogical results.125
Reflecting on its history, the Court explained, “The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought.”126 The Court ultimately held this challenge in the same vein
as challenges to other occupational licensing statutes and rejected the notion
that it was a violation of due process.127
The timeline and language of these cases highly suggests free speech
challenges by unlicensed individuals to nutrition and dietetic licensing
119. Id. at 112.
120. See id. at 429 (holding the “statutes regulating the practice of medicine or dentistry”
contained similar provisions to other state statutory schemes, but each occupation necessarily requires
different considerations when evaluating their constitutional validity).
121. Id.
122. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
123. See id. at 486 (explaining the differences between an optician, ophthalmologist, and
optometrist).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 487–88 (opining on the legislature’s rationale behind the statute, which seemingly
instituted a “needless, wasteful requirement in many cases”).
126. See id. at 488 (citing Nebbia v. New York as supporting precedent).
127. See id. at 491 (explaining “[i]t seems to us that this regulation is on the same constitutional
footing as the denial to corporations of the right to practice dentistry”).
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statutes, as a baseline, are unlikely to succeed.128 First, the applicability of
physician specific precedent to nutrition and dietetics is seamless, given
nutrition was specifically noted by the Court as an aspect of the practice of
medicine and the same rationale and deference was extended to statutes
regulating dentists.129 Next, medical licensing is unique as there are patently
different considerations for enacting statutes to regulate medical versus nonmedical professions, suggesting medical professions have a stronger tie to
public health and safety with respect to licensing as an exercise of state
police power.130 Finally, this precedent supports specifically giving
significant deference to the legislature in enacting these laws, as the
regulation of these professions is clearly within the control of the states.131
The only facet these cases do not clearly indicate, which is of key importance
to a free speech challenge, is the point where speech by anyone on any
medical topic becomes regulable professional conduct.132
2. Interpreting Thomas and Lowe to Separate Speech from Conduct:
“Some Other Factor” and “Personal Nexus”
An essential step in analyzing the breadth and constitutionality of an
occupational licensing law in a free speech context is determining if state
regulation is only incidentally impacting speech by regulating professional

128. See Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 280 (indicating federal constitutional challenges to
occupational licensing laws are unlikely to be successful).
129. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23 (1889) (explaining “the properties of
vegetable and mineral substances” and the agencies by which the human system is affected, are areas
in which may require more regulation in the future as more knowledge is learned about these topics);
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 429 (1926) (extending to dentistry the holding of such occupational
licensing as a valid use of state police power).
130. See Graves, 272 U.S. at 429 (holding “employments or trades of locomotive engineers and
barbers[ ] . . . [manifestly] involve very different considerations from those relating to such professions
as dentistry requiring a high degree of scientific learning”); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 178–79
(1910) (explaining the significant link medical occupations have on “the lives and health of the people”
makes such occupations “obviously one of those vocations where the power of the state may be exerted
to see that only properly qualified persons shall undertake its responsible and difficult duties”).
131. See Watson, 218 U.S. at 177 (explaining “the details of such legislation rest primarily within
the discretion of the state legislature”); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (deferring to the legislature to
“balance the advantages and disadvantages” of laws enacted pursuant to state police powers).
132. See Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 506 (1903) (emphasis added) (holding “[t]he power of
a state to make reasonable provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice
of medicine . . . is not open to question” but not identifying what constitutes practicing medicine); Graves,
272 U.S. at 429 (holding in favor of “statues regulating the practice of medicine or dentistry” but not
defining the scope of what that practice entails).
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conduct.133 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided minimal
guidance as to how, if at all, occupational licensing statues specifically
implicate free speech rights.134 For many years, the concurring opinions of
Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins135 and Justice White in Lowe v. S.E.C.136
provided the only insight as to how to balance occupational licensing against
freedom of speech.137 While they are not majority opinions, their insight
is highly persuasive when considered with historical case holdings for
medical licensure.138 By combining the concurrences in Thomas and Lowe,
and with the aforementioned historical deference to state police power, the
line differentiating between regulations of speech and regulations of
professional conduct for medical professions becomes more clear.139
When this framework is then applied to nutrition and dietetics licensure, the
outcome for many free speech challenges should be holding such laws as
within the power of the States to enact and enforce because occupational
licensing only incidentally implicates speech.
In Thomas, Texas law regulating labor union activities required union
organizers to register with the Secretary of State and obtain an organizer’s
133. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (holding
permissible the regulation of professional conduct when it incidentally implicates speech).
134. See Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding a licensing
statute limiting persons who may practice law did not limit freedom of speech and was therefore not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993); Sherman, supra note 9,
at 184–86 (reporting Justice White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v. S.E.C. as one of the few resources
from the Supreme Court discussing occupational licensing); Smolla, supra note 69, at 68 (conveying
the provisional nature of the professional-speech doctrine).
135. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
136. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
137. See Sherman, supra note 9, at 185–86 (discussing Justice White’s reliance on
Justice Jackson’s prior opinion in Thomas); Smolla, supra note 69, at 75 (citing Thomas v. Collins as an
early free speech case discussing the state’s power to regulate professional speech).
138. Justice Jackson was not joined in his concurrence in Thomas. Justice White’s concurrence
in Lowe was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Despite not being majority opinions,
lower courts have ruled in favor of upholding licensing statutes citing Justice White’s opinion, which
draws heavily on Justice Jackson’s opinion. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293,
1308–09 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Justice White’s reasoning in Lowe as highly persuasive authority when
discussing the difference between regulations of speech and regulations of professional conduct);
see also Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2016) (describing several circuit courts as
embracing Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe when applying the professional speech doctrine).
139. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring) (distinguishing between the state’s
exercise of the power to mandate professional licensure against the state’s ability to regulate anyone’s
speech to the general public); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting the application
of a licensure law to unlicensed professionals who publicly publish articles would be “a direct restraint
on freedom of speech”).
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card prior to soliciting others to become members of the union.140
Thomas, a union leader in several nationally prominent union organizations,
traveled to Texas to speak to a group of non-unionized plant employees and
solicit their membership.141 Thomas did not register with the state and was
subsequently arrested and charged with violating the Texas statute.142 The
Texas Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of state police
power, as the statute was “for the protection of the general welfare of the
public . . . with special reference to safeguarding laborers from imposture
when approached by an alleged organizer.”143 The Texas Supreme Court
held the state could indirectly interfere with freedom of speech to a limited
extent if “reasonably necessary for the protection of the general public.”144
The registration requirement in question did not impose a general free
speech restraint but rather regulated the business and economic activities of
unions whose agents were operating on its behalf.145
The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected this interpretation
on writ of certiorari, holding the danger presented by Thomas speaking did
not outweigh the restrictions placed on the exercise of his First Amendment
rights.146 The majority held because Thomas did not speak for
renumeration, he was not subject to the licensing requirement.147 The
Court explained the “requirement that one must register before he
undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement
is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment” but
once the speaker “undertakes the collection of funds or securing
subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or
identification requirement may be imposed.”148
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson sought to reconcile where to
further draw the line between the “two well-established, but at times
overlapping, constitutional principles” at issue in the case; specifically, when
might the state legitimately regulate the conduct of professional organization
140. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 519 n.1.
141. Id. at 521.
142. Id. at 523.
143. Id. at 524.
144. Id. at 525.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 537 (holding “[a] restriction so destructive of the right of public discussion, without
greater or more imminent danger to the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with
the freedoms secured by the First Amendment”).
147. Id. at 540.
148. Id.
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members versus when regulation impermissibly infringes on free speech.149
Justice Jackson thought speech must be associated with “some other factor
which the state may regulate so as to bring the whole within official control”
under a licensing statute.150 He illustrated the lack of such a distinguishing
factor to separate the two principles, stating “the state may prohibit the
pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license but I do not think
it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to
follow or reject any school of medical thought.”151 Using the underlying
case as an example, Justice Jackson further explained the state “may regulate
one who makes a business or a livelihood of soliciting funds or
memberships for unions. But I do not think it can prohibit one, even if he
is a salaried labor leader, from making an address to a public meeting of
workmen[.]”152
In Lowe v. S.E.C., the Securities and Exchange Commission sought action
against a former investment adviser, Lowe, who after losing his registration
continued providing non personalized investment advice in published
newsletters.153 Such publications by Lowe were allegedly in violation of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.154 The majority held the nonpersonalized nature of the writings, as offered to the general public and not
to any one client in particular, did not fall within the Act’s definition of an
investment adviser and were therefore excluded from the Act’s registration
requirement.155
While the majority opinion was more mindful of the First Amendment
implications on freedom of the press, Justice White’s concurrence focused
on the impact of the licensing requirement on the freedom of speech.156
The crux of the issue, in Justice White’s view, was the vital difference
between speech made to the public at large and speech made incidentally as
part of conduct in the profession.157 Justice White, drawing specifically on
149. Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 547 (Jackson, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 544. Justice Jackson also illustrated, “A state may forbid one without its license to
practice law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed person from making a speech
about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right, including recommending that
his hearers organize to support his views.” Id.
152. Id. at 544–45.
153. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 183–184 (1985).
154. Id. at 184.
155. Id. at 210, 211.
156. Id. at 228–29 (White, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring).
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Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Thomas, who classified the establishment of
a “personal nexus between the professional and client” in which the
professional “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to
exercise judgment on behalf of the client” as the point where professional
speech becomes professional conduct, appropriately regulable under state
licensing schemes.158 Government regulation infringes on free speech
when the personal nexus is absent and the speaker is not “exercising
judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances
he is directly acquainted.”159 In Lowe, seeking to prevent the unregistered
former investment adviser from publishing general investment advice for
public benefit, even for compensation, would be “a direct restraint on
freedom of speech . . . subject to the searching scrutiny” of the First
Amendment.160
The concurring opinions from Thomas and Lowe are insightful for several
reasons. First, both opinions support the view that the state may license
individuals whose conduct is clearly in accordance with a professional
discipline, with few limitations or implications regarding the First
Amendment—in line with pre- and post-Lochner holdings.161 Next, both
opinions suggest a difference between speaking to the public versus
speaking privately on an individualized basis, with public speech perhaps
meriting more First Amendment protection.162 Justice Jackson in Thomas
also identified receiving compensation as a critical distinction when
speaking, signaling the speech in that context tends to be more akin to

158. Id. (White, J., concurring).
159. Id. (White, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 233 (White, J., concurring).
161. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544–45 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“So the state
to an extent not necessary now to determine may regulate one who makes a business or a livelihood
of soliciting funds or memberships for unions.”); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (holding a professional licensing statute may not abridge speech “[w]here the personal
nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising
judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted.”);
Smolla, supra note 69, at 79 (“[T]he opinions posit that there is no First Amendment impediment to
government requiring a license for certain professional activity.”).
162. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 45 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“But I do not think . . . [the state] can
prohibit one, even if he is a salaried labor leader, from making an address to a public meeting of
workmen, telling them their rights as he sees them and urging them to unite in general or to join a
specific union.”); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (“One who takes the affairs of a client
personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s
individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a
profession . . . the professional’s speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession.”).
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professional conduct; receiving remuneration for providing professional
services.163 Finally and most importantly, both opinions strongly support
the notion that “the distinguishing factor was whether the speech in any
particular case was ‘associat[ed] . . . with some other factor which the state may
regulate so as to bring the whole within official control’” of the state.164
Given the nature of the opinions, however, their guidance is potentially
limited in applicability to medical professions by some factors. Both
opinions were not the majority, rendering the opinions not binding
precedent in all occupational licensing cases that include medical licensing
challenges.165 Further, neither case dealt specifically with medical licensure
and neither opinion discusses the exhaustive range of their logical and legal
conclusions.166
Despite this, the ideas from both opinions are uniquely helpful in medical
challenges because of the clarity by which their conclusions can aid courts
in determining “[the] rough distinction” between whether a state licensing
scheme “operates as a regulation of speech or of professional conduct” in
medical licensure challenges.167 Principally, the considerations of both
(1) “some other factor . . . the state . . . [can] regulate,” and (2) establishing “the
personal nexus between the professional and client” are particularly
instructive, because there is one commonality to all medical professions that
163. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The modern state owes and attempts
to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its
money. When one does so through the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding
the public against untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against unauthorized
representation of agency . . . through a licensing system.”).
164. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S.
at 547 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
165. Justice Jackson was not joined in his concurrence in Thomas. Justice White’s concurrence
in Lowe was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Despite not being majority opinions,
lower courts have ruled in favor of upholding licensing statutes citing Justice White’s opinion, which
draws heavily on Justice Jackson’s opinion. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293,
1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Justice White’s reasoning in Lowe as highly persuasive authority
when discussing the difference between regulations of speech and regulations of professional conduct);
see also Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2016) (describing several circuit courts as
embracing Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe when applying the professional speech doctrine).
166. Justice Jackson did illustrate his reasoning using a legal and medical example, which could
indicate he was mindful to the most commonly licensed professions of the period that heavily relied
on speech to accomplish required professional conduct. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license but
I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject
any school of medical thought.”).
167. Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring).
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state governments regulate that can help identify where speech ends and
when professional conduct begins: the diagnosis and treatment of a disease
or medical condition.168
B. Illustrating the Utility of Thomas and Lowe to Distinguish Speech from
Licensed Conduct
Drawing the line at the point speech becomes professional conduct has
not been clearly or easily determinable for licensable occupations, despite
being a practice “long familiar to the bar.”169 But the point is clearly one
the judiciary must decide, given the potential chilling effect government
regulation can have on free speech rights.170 Perhaps the most important
determination is the point at which speech by unlicensed individuals
becomes regulated professional conduct requiring a license by a state
occupational licensing statute, yet no clear guidance currently exists to help
make this determination.171 For free speech challenges to medical licensing
statutes, using the some other factor and personal nexus framework from Thomas

168. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring); see Nat’l. Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (holding permissible the regulation of professional conduct that
incidentally implicates speech, such as “part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonably licensing
and regulation by the State”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
884 (1992)).
169. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting Simon & Schuster Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment)). The Court admits specifically defining “professional speech” is difficult. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. at 2375 (citing Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011)).
170. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); Thomas, 323 U.S. at 529 (“[T]he duty our system
places on this Court [is] to say where the individual’s freedom ends and the State’s power begins.”);
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 230 (White, J., concurring) (“Although congressional enactments come to this Court
with a presumption in favor of their validity, Congress’ characterization of its legislation cannot be
decisive of the question of its constitutionality where individual rights are at issue.”). The Court has
reiterated several dangers associated with government regulation of speech, including the suppression
of unpopular ideas or information, and the negative impact of the marketplace of ideas by which
professionals and others communicate and share independent ideas. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75;
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“When Government seeks to use
its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information
or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”).
171. See Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183,
184 (2015) (“Until recently, the only significant Supreme Court guidance on occupational-speech
licensing came from . . . Lowe v. SEC. Since that case, there have only been only a handful of lowercourt rulings . . . and an equally scant amount of scholarly literature.”).
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and Lowe can help identify the judicially-determinable point where speech
becomes regulable conduct.172
1. Satisfying Some Other Factor and Personal Nexus for Medical
Occupational Licensing
Satisfying some other factor for medical occupational licensing is simple. If
the rich history of enacting such statutes is not enough support, state
government’s role in health care is.173 Satisfying the personal nexus
requirement is slightly more challenging, but the diagnosing and treatment
of diseases or medical conditions seems precisely what Justice White had in
mind.174 Diagnosing and treating diseases or medical conditions is
inextricably tied to state government regulation of health care and health
insurance, as the health and welfare of society requires health care providers
to make the determinations necessary for diagnosis and treatment of
comorbidities.175 Medical diagnoses are required and reported through
medical coding to track disease status, monitor communicable diseases,
communicate with health insurance providers, and various other functions
regulable by state governments.176 The historical precedent supporting
medical licensure, and state government’s involvement in health care, makes
clear that they get to choose—through occupational licensing—who
diagnoses and treats their citizens.
172. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988) (holding
“[g]enerally, speakers need not obtain a license to speak. However, that rule is not absolute.”); Pickup
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (questioning, “by what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’
on the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”).
173. RICHARD D. REMINGTON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 172 (1988)
(describing states as “the principal government entity responsible for protecting the public’s health in
the United States.”).
174. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (explaining the personal nexus as the point
when the professional “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment
on behalf of the client”).
175. REMINGTON ET AL., supra note 173, at 172.
176. See International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD), WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/standards/classifications/classification-of-diseases [https://
perma.cc/S84Y-5VDC] (listing the purposes and uses of ICD codes, to include identifying health
trends and defining “the universe of diseases, disorders, injuries, and other related health conditions”);
Peggy Dotson, CPT® Codes: What Are They, Why Are They Necessary, and How Are They Developed?,
2 ADVANCES IN WOUND CARE 583, 584 (2013) (describing the Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT) coding system as “the preferred system for coding and describing healthcare services and
procedures in federal programs (Medicare and Medicaid) and throughout the United States by private
insurers and providers of healthcare services”).
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2. Using Diagnosis and Treatment of a Disease or Medical Condition
as the Personal Nexus Marks the Line Where Speech Becomes Incidental
to Licensable Conduct
Courts have struggled with identifying a generally applicable point at
which speech becomes professional medical conduct subject to an
occupational licensing statute.177 Satisfying Justice White’s personal nexus is
the key point in that determination. Analyzing past legal challenges helps
identify that diagnosis or treatment of a disease or medical condition is the
best approach to meeting the criterion. King v. Governor of New Jersey178
serves as an example.179 In King, the Third Circuit considered a free speech
challenge to a New Jersey law proscribing licensed counselors from
engaging in sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) therapy with minor
clients.180 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
initially held SOCE as professional conduct, rendering it subject to state
regulation with no associated First Amendment protection.181 The Third
Circuit rejected this notion, observing the lack of Supreme Court authority
available to help ascertain whether SOCE, which essentially is purely speech
in the form of talk therapy, could or should be classified as conduct and not
speech.182 The Third Circuit then cited Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project 183 as justification for why such a holding by the district court was
incorrect, as the Supreme Court in Holder held legal counseling was speech
and not conduct even when used to deliver professional services, rejecting
177. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc) (criticizing the majority for providing “no principled doctrinal basis for its dichotomy” in holding
certain verbal communication by mental health providers as professional conduct); See King v.
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014) (questioning the utility of the district court’s
suggested approach of using the application of methods, practices, and procedures, to determine
whether speech is professional conduct).
178. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
179. Id. at 231. The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Pickup v. Brown is very similar with the district
court’s holding in King ; however, King is used for simplicity as it admittedly draws heavily from Pickup.
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1208; see King, 767 F.3d at 226 (explaining “the District Court relied heavily on the
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Pickup”).
180. See King, 767 F.3d at 221 (explaining the challenge was brought by counselors seeking to
utilize SOCE therapy, but also was challenged via third-party claims representing the plaintiff’s affected
minor patients).
181. Id. at 223–24 (reviewing the district court holding which reasoned SOCE counseling was
conduct, receiving no First Amendment protection).
182. See id. at 224–25 (“Defendants have not directed us to any authority from the Supreme
Court or this circuit that have characterized verbal or written communications as ‘conduct’ based on
the function these communications serve.”).
183. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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the underlying defendant’s arguments to the contrary.184 Later in the King
opinion, the Third Circuit would hold the statute valid when applying the
professional speech doctrine, which would later be rejected in Becerra.185
By focusing on where the Third Circuit believed the district court erred,
it appeared to have missed what it was doing correctly: citing appropriate
case law and attempting to define the point at which speech becomes
licensable conduct.186 The district court sought out similar case precedent
in Pickup—which dealt with the identical professional field and topic—
rather than deciding Holder was binding.187 Citing Holder as binding
authority is misapplied in this instance because doing so fails to consider the
crucial element necessary for making a judicial determination between
speech and conduct, which lies at the fundamental difference separating
medical professions from non-medical professions.188 As explained by
Justice White, the point speech becomes professional conduct is establishing
the personal nexus, when the professional “takes the affairs of a client
personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
client.”189 The district court attempted to define what that personal nexus
could be by explaining:

184. Id. at 27, 28. The Third Circuit also cited Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey as an
example authority of when a state law regulated speech and not treatment or conduct. See King,
767 F.3d at 230–31 (citing Casey as supporting authority). While the Third Circuit indicated a plurality
supported this holding, the Supreme Court itself in Becerra explicitly indicates the joint opinion from
Casey is an example of when such a statute is a permissible regulation of professional conduct which
incidentally implicates speech, not when a statute regulates speech rather than conduct. See Becerra,
138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citing Casey as supporting authority for when “[s]tates may regulate professional
conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” and later explaining, “[t]he joint
opinion explained that the law regulated speech only ‘as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.’”) (emphasis in original).
185. King, 767 F.3d at 240. But see Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (abrogating King).
186. See King v. Christie, 981 F.Supp.2d 296, 309–10 (D.N.J. 2013) (holding Pickup as
persuasive authority due to its similar fact pattern and attempting to classify SOCE as professional
conduct).
187. See id. at 313 (explaining “[a]lthough the Pickup decision is not binding on [the district
court], given the relevance of this opinion, and the dearth of decisions from the Third Circuit or other
jurisdictions addressing the interplay between constitutionally protected speech and professional
counseling, [the court would] turn to the Ninth Circuit’s decision where appropriate”).
188. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043,
1054–55 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the State’s interest in regulating mental health as more compelling
than its interest in regulating attorney solicitation, given the safety and health implications of the
profession).
189. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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[T]he line of demarcation between conduct and speech is whether the
counselor is attempting to communicate information or a particular viewpoint
to the client or whether the counselor is attempting to apply methods,
practices, and procedures to bring about a change in the client—the former is
speech and the latter is conduct.190

The district court reached this conclusion after appropriately considering
precedent permitting state occupational licensing and aptly considering the
implication of holding SOCE as speech; it would mean “any regulation of
professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First
Amendment speech rights.”191
The Third Circuit, elucidates the shortcomings of the district court’s
suggestion for the personal nexus in King.192 As the Third Circuit
demonstrates, the analysis considering whether the speaker “is attempting
to apply methods, practices, and procedures” fails to differentiate between
speech made by unlicensed versus licensed individuals:
For instance, consider a sophomore psychology major who tells a fellow
student that he can reduce same-sex attractions by avoiding effeminate
behaviors and developing a closer relationship with his father. Surely this
advice is not “conduct” merely because it seeks to apply “principles” the
sophomore recently learned in a behavioral psychology course. Yet it would
be strange indeed to conclude that the same words, spoken with the same
intent, somehow become “conduct” when the speaker is a licensed counselor.
That the counselor is speaking as a licensed professional may affect the level
of First Amendment protection her speech enjoys, but this fact does not
transmogrify her words into “conduct.”193

However, the district court’s suggested analysis breaks down, utilizing the
diagnosis and treatment of a disease or medical condition as the personal nexus
190. Christie, 981 F.Supp.2d at 319.
191. See id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)) (explaining that
holding SOCE as speech “runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state generally may enact
laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing medicine and mental health
services”).
192. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying the district court’s
proffered analysis to produce unreliable results, suggesting “[t]o classify some communications as
‘speech’ and others as ‘conduct’ is to engage in nothing more than a ‘labeling game’”) (citing Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc)).
193. King, 767 F.3d at 228.
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succeeds.194 As applied to the Third Circuit’s analogies, the sophomore
psychology major is likely not attempting to diagnose or treat their fellow
student’s disease or medical condition. Doing so would violate of the state
occupational licensing statute regulating the practice of psychologists.195
The fact that a licensed professional might speak the same words in any
instance is not alone determinative; only when speech is made in making a
diagnosis or treating a disease or medical condition does it become
professional conduct subject to state regulation.196 Turning to the
underlying case in King, the talk therapy of SOCE was meant to be used as
a therapeutic intervention to alter sexual orientation.197 However, the New
Jersey legislature demonstrated that “being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a
disease, disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming,” and “major
professional associations of mental health practitioners and researchers in
the United States have recognized this fact for nearly 40 years.”198 As such,
engaging in SOCE would not only be inappropriate professional conduct
by attempting to diagnosis and treat an unrecognized disease or medical
condition as the personal nexus, it would also go against the state’s legislative
guidance as the other factor. Such speech by unlicensed individuals would
violate state licensing of counselors, and licensed counselors wishing to
engage in SOCE could become subject to a professional malpractice suit or
adverse action by the State Board of Psychological Examiners.199
Another example to demonstrate the utility of the suggested other
factor/personal nexus approach for medical cases is showing how it might have
been applied in Becerra.200 In the case, a group of licensed and unlicensed
194. Utilizing the state’s regulation of the health care profession as the other factor and diagnosing
and treating a disease or medical condition as the personal nexus may together be referred to as “the other
factor/personal nexus approach” for this analysis.
195. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-6 (West 2019) (explaining psychology students are only
exempt from licensure when practicing “under qualified supervision in a training institution or facility
recognized by the board”).
196. See id. § 45:14B-2 (West 2019) (defining the practice of psychology and professional
psychological services).
197. King, 767 F.3d at 221.
198. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1–54).
199. Indeed, the fact SOCE cannot be used to diagnose or treat a recognized medical
condition—which in turn suggests it lacks indicia of professional conduct—makes it more akin to a
doctor failing to obtain informed consent before operating; a common ground for a malpractice suit
“firmly entrenched in American tort law.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2373 (2018).
200. See id. at 2373–74 (explaining the unlicensed notice was not defended on any other grounds
than commercial speech under Zauderer).
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crisis pregnancy centers, which offer a range of pregnancy-related services,
challenged a California statute that required them to provide certain notices
on-site and on all advertising materials.201 As the Court noted when
addressing the unlicensed notice, several of the services provided by
unlicensed facilities triggered the required notice but did not require a
medical license to perform.202 Applying the other factor/personal nexus
approach incidentally supports holding these instances as speech and not
conduct; the listed services provided by the unlicensed clinics not used to
diagnose or treat pregnancy—the medical condition at issue—are used or
made pre-diagnosis or pre-treatment for pregnancy.203 Under the other
factor/personal nexus approach, the Court did not and need not analyze
whether the statute incidentally impacted speech by regulating professional
conduct because there was no personal nexus established through the
diagnosis and treatment of a disease or medical condition.204
While drawing the line at the point speech becomes professional conduct
has previously not been clearly or easily determinable for licensable
occupations, utilizing the other factor/personal nexus approach for cases dealing
with occupational licensure of medical professions appears to provide some
general utility when using the diagnosis and treatment of a disease or medical

201. Id. at 2370. The Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act
(FACT Act) required licensed clinics to “notify women that California provides free or low-cost
services, including abortions, and give them a phone number to call,” and required unlicensed clinics
to “notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical services.” Id. at 2368.
202. Id. at 2377. An unlicensed facility was identified as providing at least two of the four
requirements:
(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant
women. (2) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis. (3) The facility advertises
or solicits patrons with offers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or pregnancy
options counseling. (4) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect health information from
clients.
Id. at 2370.
203. See id. at 2377 (listing the services provided by unlicensed clinics including collecting health
information, advertising pregnancy options counseling, and providing “over-the-counter pregnancy
testing” as services not requiring a California medical license to provide).
204. See id. at 2372 (explaining the statute regulating the unlicensed notice was not defended
because “[s]tates may regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves
speech.”); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (concluding licensing
provisions do not limit on freedom of speech when “the professional’s speech is incidental to the
conduct of the profession”).
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condition as the personal nexus.205 Even when applied in King to psychology,
a field necessarily utilizing speech to facilitate professional conduct, the other
factor/personal nexus approach clearly identified when speech became
professional conduct. When applied to nutrition and dietetics licensing
cases, the result is expectedly similar.
3. Applying the Diagnosis and Treatment of a Disease or Medical
Condition Other Factor/Personal Nexus Approach to Nutrition and
Dietetics Licensing Cases
Occupational licensing statutes governing nutrition and dietetic practice
have only recently been challenged on free speech grounds.206 While
generally one “need not obtain a license to speak,” a necessary limit exists
when speech is incidental to the regulation of professional conduct.207
Regulation for medical professions, including nutrition and dietetics, is
especially warranted because of the close ties to the health and welfare of
the public.208 When applying the other factor/personal nexus approach to
nutrition, the line between general speech about nutrition versus speech
incidental to regulated professional conduct can easily be drawn at the

205. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing the majority for providing “no principled doctrinal
basis for its dichotomy” in holding certain verbal communication by mental health providers as
professional conduct, questioning “by what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly
‘speech,’ on the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”).
206. Two federal cases have been reported over the past eight years. Kokesch Del Castillo v.
Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2019); Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 229
(4th Cir. 2013). Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit with an opinion still
pending at the time of this Comment’s publication.
207. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988) (holding
“[g]enerally, speakers need not obtain a license to speak. However, that rule is not absolute.”); Becerra,
138 S. Ct. at 2373 (holding permissible the regulation of professional conduct when it incidentally
implicates speech).
208. See Kokesch Del Castillo, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC at 16 n.23 (describing how “improper
dietary advice can harm different groups of people” by explaining “a carbohydrate-restricted diet,
without supplemental folic acid intake, presents increased risks of birth defects to women who are
pregnant or who may become pregnant”); Rabia Bushra et al., Food-Drug Interactions, 26 OMAN MED. J.
77, 78 (2011) (describing the pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic principles involved in food-drug
interactions needed to be accounted for in patients taking medicines, such as grapefruit inhibition of
cytochrome P450, the food contraindications associated with anticonvulsants and antihypertensive
medications, the impact of a high fiber diet on drugs like Simvastatin, the influence tyramine-containing
foods has on monoamine oxidase inhibitor function, and a multitude of other examples).
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provision of medical nutrition therapy.209 This is clearly demonstrated by
applying the other factor/personal nexus approach to two federal cases which
considered free speech challenges to nutrition and dietetics licensure:
Cooksey v. Futrell 210 and Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip.211
In Cooksey, the underlying plaintiff was hospitalized from a diabetic coma
and diagnosed with Type II diabetes.212 Cooksey subsequently changed his
diet and began an exercise regimen, resulting in weight loss and blood sugar
normalization.213 He later created a website to share his experiences on his
successful weight loss and lifestyle changes. He also offered meal plans and
recipes, a question and answer column, personal dietary mentoring, and a
fee-based life coaching service.214 Cooksey was eventually reported to the
North Carolina Dietetics/Nutrition licensing board, which claimed Cooksey
“was engaging in the unlicensed practice of dietetics” and instructed him to
make various changes to his webpage to comply with the state licensing
statute.215 Cooksey complied out of “fear of civil and criminal action
against him,” removing his fee-services, placing a disclaimer on his
homepage, and stopping his question and answer component.216 Cooksey
then sued the State Board, alleging it violated his First Amendment
rights.217 The district court dismissed Cooksey’s complaint for lack of
standing and ripeness, claiming that he suffered no injury because he
voluntarily made the changes to his website.218 The Fourth Circuit reversed
and held the State Board’s actions had “a non-speculative and objectively
reasonable chilling effect” on Cooksey’s speech and his claim on its merits
was “irrelevant to the standing analysis.”219 Further, Cooksey’s claim was
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(vv)(1) (2018) (defining medical nutrition therapy as “nutritional
diagnostic, therapy, and counseling services for the purpose of disease management which are
furnished by a registered dietitian or nutrition professional . . . pursuant to a referral by a physician”).
210. Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2013).
211. Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2019).
212. Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 229.
213. Id. at 230. Cooksey described his dietary changes as adopting a “paleolithic diet,” a diet
low in carbohydrates and high in fat. Id. Cooksey alleged this diet is in contrast with the diet
recommended to him by a licensed dietitian. Id. at 229–30.
214. Id. at 230. The website entertained approximately 20,000 visitors in December 2011 and
January 2012. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 232. The disclaimer explained he “was not a licensed medical professional and did
not have any formal medical education or special dietary qualifications.” Id. at 230.
217. Id. at 232–33.
218. Id. at 233.
219. Id. at 236, 239.
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ripe because he did not obtain clear guidance on how he could further
operate his website without violating the statute.220 The State Board later
issued guidelines “allowing people to give ordinary diet advice” without a
license, settling the case.221
The State Board guidelines in Cooksey make applying the other
factor/personal nexus approach seamless because the State Board clarified what
did and did not constitute the diagnosis or treatment of a disease or medical
condition by further defining medical nutrition therapy in the licensing
statute—the defined personal nexus.222 Defining medical nutrition therapy
and including statutory definitions of permissible practices provided the
personal nexus framework by which nutrition speech became regulated
professional conduct.223 Cooksey’s ordinary information about grocery
shopping is no more an attempt to diagnose or treat Type II diabetes than
a general nutrition article discussing the benefits of eating fruits and
vegetables; neither falls under the statutory definition of medical nutrition
therapy, which is “[t]he provision of nutrition care services for the purpose
of managing or treating a medical condition.”224
Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip further elaborates how defining medical
nutrition therapy essentially helps adopt the other factor/personal nexus
approach.225 In Del Castillo, the plaintiff was a health coach operating a
business in California called Constitution Nutrition.226 Del Castillo later
moved to Florida and continued to operate her business, which offered to
review the client’s medical history, provide individualized diet and advice,
and provide motivational interviewing and goal setting for a fee.227 But due
to the different licensing statutes in California and Florida, Del Castillo was
unlawfully practicing nutrition and dietetics once her business began
220. See id. at 241 (holding Cooksey’s claims were ripe because no “clarification of the conduct
that [he] can engage in” without being subject to “threat of penalty” was provided by the State Board).
221. See J. Justin Wilson, Victory for ‘Caveman’ Blogger in Free Speech Fight, INST. FOR
JUST. (Feb. 18, 2015), https://ij.org/press-release/north-carolina-free-speech-release-2-18-2015/
[https://perma.cc/F3CM-69GF] (“All [Cooksey] wanted to do was give adults advice on what they
should buy at the grocery store . . . . These new guidelines make clear that [Cooksey] can provide that
advice to anyone who wants to hear it[.]”).
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-352(3)(a) (West 2019).
223. See id. § 90-368(12) (exempting “[a]ny individual who provides nutrition information,
guidance, encouragement, individualized nutrition recommendations, or weight control services that
do not constitute medical nutrition therapy as defined” in the statute).
224. Id. § 90-352(3)(a).
225. Kokesch Del Castillo v. Philip, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2019).
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 2 n.3.
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operating in Florida.228 Del Castillo was fined by the State Licensing Board
and later brought an action alleging the licensing statute was a violation of
“her First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”229 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida held the state statute was
a valid occupational licensing scheme that has an incidental impact on
speech.230 The district court distinguished Holder and held the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Becerra, which held “[s]tates may regulate professional
conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech” was
controlling and in line with Eleventh Circuit precedent.231
Del Castillo is notable because Florida’s licensing statute does not explicitly
define medical nutrition therapy.232 However, the application of the other
factor/personal nexus approach helps elucidate why Del Castillo’s nutrition
services were classified as professional conduct in violation of the statute.
Del Castillo specifically offered individualized health information to her
clients, based on health history and established goals.233 In contrast, the
plaintiff in Cooksey only sought to offer general nutrition information on
grocery shopping—which would not expectedly vary from customer to
customer.234 Del Castillo’s services established a personal nexus as the
professional provider of medical nutrition therapy by going beyond just
generalized advice and instead providing fee-based and tailored nutrition
interventions to treat individuals diagnosed medical conditions or diseases
as determined by their collected health history.235 The Florida statute may
be improved by clearly defining what constitutes medical nutrition therapy

228. Id. at 3, n.7; see Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, Licensure Information by State, EAT
RIGHT PRO, [https://perma.cc/Y8Q3-X262] (identifying California as not having practice exclusivity
but Florida as having it).
229. Kokesch Del Castillo, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC at 4.
230. See id. at 12–13 (considering Locke binding and holding the statute was “a generally
applicable professional licensing law with a merely incidental impact on protected speech”).
231. Id. at 26, 28–29.
232. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.503 (West 2019) (defining only “dietetics and nutrition
practice”).
233. Kokesch Del Castillo, No. 3:17-CV-722-MCR-HTC at 2 n.3.
234. See id. at 28 (citation omitted) (distinguishing the present case from another dealing with
tour guides who “provide virtually identical information to each customer”); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S.
181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting the attempt to prevent the publishing of general
investment advice for public benefit would be “a direct restraint on freedom of speech . . . subject to
the searching scrutiny” of the First Amendment).
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(vv)(1) (2018) (defining medical nutrition therapy as “nutritional
diagnostic, therapy, and counseling services for the purpose of disease management which are
furnished by a registered dietitian or nutrition professional”).
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in order to provide clarity to unlicensed individuals and potentially avoid
future challenges.
As Cooksey and Del Castillo demonstrate, applying the other factor/personal
nexus approach to nutrition and dietetics cases can help individuals and
courts determine the point at which ordinary speech becomes regulable
professional conduct for nutrition and dietetics. State statutes defining
medical nutrition therapy significantly help in the application by defining the
personal nexus, as does defining specific instances where unlicensed
individuals may engage in speech thought to possibly implicate the
statutorily defined scope of practice.
C. Recommendations for Legislatures and Courts to Consider When Reflecting on
Their Nutrition Occupational Licensing Statutes
Clearly the value and importance of nutrition and dietetics to public safety
and welfare is predominant, given forty-seven states, Washington D.C., and
Puerto Rico have enacted occupational licensing laws for it.236 However,
there are notable differences among how each statute is written, resulting in
varying degrees of licensing.237 These differences result in a lack of uniform
language for defining what medical nutrition therapy is, create a lack of
uniform education and experience requirements, and limits license
reciprocity between states. Differing language for each state may also distort
the line between what is permissible for anyone to say about nutrition versus
what constitutes medical nutrition therapy, which might be subject to a
licensing requirement.238 Without reciprocity, already licensed practitioners
in one state encounter delays in obtaining a new state license or are limited
in transferring and obtaining a license in another state altogether, inhibiting
potential state market growth from providers located out-of-state or
disproportionately affecting transient groups like military members and their
families.239 State legislatures seeking to offer clear language and
236. Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, Licensure Information by State, EAT RIGHT PRO,
[https://perma.cc/Y8Q3-X262].
237. Phillips & Tuma, supra note 7 (describing state regulation of nutrition and dietetics
generally takes one of three forms: licensure, state certification, or title protection only).
238. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-352(3)(a) (West 2019) (defining medical nutrition therapy
as “[t]he provision of nutrition care services for the purpose of managing or treating a medical
condition”); cf. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640E.050 (West 2019) (“‘Medical nutrition therapy’ means
the use of nutrition services by a licensed dietitian to manage, treat or rehabilitate a disease, illness,
injury or medical condition of a patient.”).
239. See N.C. GEN. § 93B-15.1 (“An occupational licensing board shall issue a temporary
practice permit to a military-trained applicant or military spouse licensed, certified, or registered in
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professional qualification standards in their statutes should consider
defining medical nutrition therapy based on the language and qualifications
adopted in Medicare and other state statutes which define it with
specificity.240 Further, states should consider seeking professional
organizations like the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, who have
developed a Model Practice Act to help standardize nutrition and dietetics
licensure laws.241 Similarly established statutes can help improve the
possibility of reciprocity between states, alleviating burdens on transient
populations and improving the state’s ability to attract nutrition and dietetic
practitioners, as needed.242
The need is paramount for a defined but malleable framework for
reviewing occupational licensing statutes regulating the multitude of medical
professions currently requiring a license, given the implications such statutes
may have on free speech rights.243 Courts should consider reviewing the
concurring opinions from Thomas and Lowe and adopt the suggested other
factor/personal nexus approach.244 As demonstrated, medical professions
another jurisdiction while the military-trained applicant or military spouse is satisfying the requirements
for licensure . . . if that jurisdiction has licensure, certification, or registration standards substantially
equivalent to the standards . . . in this State.”); see UT SUP. CT. R. 14-805(a)(2) (West 2019) (allowing
active-duty military spouses temporary admission to the State Bar during the period the active-duty
spouse is stationed in the state).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(vv)(1) (2018) (defining medical nutrition therapy as “nutritional
diagnostic, therapy, and counseling services for the purpose of disease management which are
furnished by a registered dietitian or nutrition professional”); id. § 1395x(vv)(2) (defining the academic
and experience requirements for a “registered dietitian or nutrition professional” under Medicare). A
suggested definition for medical nutrition therapy might combine Medicare’s definition with Nevada’s
statutory definition: “‘Medical nutrition therapy’ is the nutritional diagnostic, therapy, and counseling
services” used by a registered dietitian or other nutritional professional licensed by this statute, to “treat
or rehabilitate a disease, illness, injury, or medical condition of a patient.” See id. § 1395x(vv)(1)
(defining medical nutrition therapy); NEV. REV. § 640E.050 (defining medical nutrition therapy).
241. See E-mail from Pepin Andrew Tuma, Senior Dir., Government and Regulatory Affairs,
Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, to Author (Jan. 10, 2021, 10:46 PM CST) (on file with author).
242. See N.C. GEN. § 93B-15.1 (“An occupational licensing board shall issue a temporary
practice permit to a military-trained applicant or military spouse licensed, certified, or registered in
another jurisdiction while the military-trained applicant or military spouse is satisfying the requirements
for licensure . . . if that jurisdiction has licensure, certification, or registration standards substantially
equivalent to the standards . . . in this State.”).
243. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing the majority for providing “no principled doctrinal basis
for its dichotomy” in holding certain verbal communication by mental health providers as professional
conduct, questioning “by what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’ on
the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”).
244. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(explaining the distinguishing factor was whether the speech in any particular case was associated with
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constitute, at least, a unique sect of professional occupations that deserve
careful consideration when occupational licensing laws are challenged.245
Using the diagnosis and treatment of a disease or medical condition as the
personal nexus appears to help distinguish speech from professional conduct
for medical professions, aiding courts in judicially determining that point in
future cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ubiquity of nutrition’s importance to life is clearly evident: everyone
needs to eat. But not everyone is qualified to give tailored nutrition advice
to people with nutritional implicated diseases and medical conditions.
Professional licensing laws are enacted to regulate the practice of medical
fields like nutrition and dietetics to protect the public from the harm caused
by inaccurate, uninformed, and inefficacious medical information. These
statutes by their nature incidentally impact free speech when enacting
practice exclusivity for professions necessarily utilizing speech to carry out
professional conduct like medical nutrition therapy.
The three
aforementioned issues should be considered when medical licensing statutes
are enacted and/or challenged on free speech grounds.
First, the history of occupational licensing for medical professions is a
deeply rooted doctrine. The language from these historic Supreme Court
cases is indicative of how lower courts should interpret challenges to
medical occupational licensing statutes like those for nutrition and dietetics.
The medical profession is, at least, very unique in how inexplicably tied it is
to the health and welfare of the public—the bedrock on which state police
power is built.
Second, courts should consider the concurring opinions from Thomas and
Lowe when analyzing these challenges, given how other courts have
“some other factor which the state may regulate so as to bring the whole within official control” of the
state); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas and suggesting
the establishment of a personal nexus approach).
245. See Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 429 (1926) (holding statutes governing “locomotive
engineers and barbers . . . involve very different considerations from those relating to such
professions . . . requiring a high degree of scientific learning” such as “statutes regulating the practice
of medicine”); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043,
1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the State’s interest in regulating mental health more compelling than its
interest in regulating attorney solicitation, given the safety and health implications of the profession);
Larkin Jr., supra note 44, at 279–80 (describing the timeline of pre- and post-Lochner rulings as
demonstrating the unique consistency of the Supreme Court in holding the enactment of medical
licensing statutes as a valid use of state police power).
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struggled with defining the personal nexus; precisely where to draw the line
between when any speech on a medical topic becomes professional conduct,
subject to an occupational licensing statute. When applied to medical
licensing cases, using the diagnosis and treatment of a disease or medical
condition as the personal nexus in the other factor/personal nexus approach
satisfies the confusion free-speech challenges create in this area.
Third, utilizing the other factor/personal nexus approach appears to apply
best when licensure statutes specifically define the personal nexus like
nutrition and dietetics statutes often do. The professional framework
nutrition professionals utilize when providing nutrition-related care—
medical nutrition therapy—defines when the personal nexus is established,
firmly marking the line where speech becomes incidental to professional
conduct. Legislatures should strive to precisely define what constitutes
medical nutrition therapy in their nutrition and dietetics licensure statutes
and attempt to similarly define the personal nexus for statutes regulating other
medical professions. Including a definition provides both licensed and
unlicensed individuals clarity on when speech is an incidental component of
professional medical conduct, as well as aid courts if free speech challenges
arise in the future. States should strive to adopt similar language for
licensing statutes, such as the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics Model
Practice Act for nutrition and dietetics specifically, and establish a consistent
minimum standard for professional competencies required to practice.
These both will help enable interstate reciprocity, decrease the likelihood of
transient populations encountering different standards when crossing state
lines, and potentially help in uniformly addressing the national overweight
and obesity epidemic.
Ultimately, the enactment of occupational licensing statutes for nutrition
and dietetics is a constitutionally permissible and appropriate scheme,
utilizing state police power to necessarily protect the public from potentially
incompetent, untrustworthy, unskilled providers attempting to treat patients
with diet related comorbidities. States have, and should continue to have,
the authority to grant a “license to kale.”
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